Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

Current position unknown

Member of 15th, 16th and 17th CPC Central Committees.

Party positions in Inner Mongolia since 1990.

In 1997 moved to Qinghai Province; first Governor, then Party Secretary 1999 – 2001.

Party Secretary of Yunnan Province from 2001 to 2011.

Quotations By/Comments About:

• Xinhua 2010: (Yunnan experiencing its worst drought in about 100 years. Millions are short of food and drinking water.) “To offset these losses, up to 2 million people in Yunnan are expected to migrate for work this year, up from 1.2 million last year, said Bai Enpei,”
• Guardian (quoting Xinhua) July 2008: (In response to police killing two protesters in a widely reported protest by rubber farmers against low prices paid by authorities.) Bai Enpei said that the provincial authorities should listen “attentively to the complaints and appeal of local residents, making great efforts to rescue the injured people, and consoling family members of the dead to prevent the matter from escalating”.
• Reuters 2008: (concerning plans to dam the Nu/Salween River, including at World Heritage site Tiger Leaping Gorge. Project was put on hold by Wen Jiabao, permanently scrapped in 2007 by Yunnan authorities despite work having begun in stealth. Plans exist to dam upstream in a Tibetan area.) “Yunnan is still hoping to build controversial dams and hydropower plants on the upper reaches of the Salween River….Bai Enpei, Yunnan’s Communist Party boss, told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of China’s annual meeting of parliament that the dams would bring much needed income to the area, which in turn would help environmental protection. ‘We are actively pushing the development of hydropower plants, including on the Nu River,’ he said…. you would wonder how you could build dams in such a beautiful area. But that’s not the case. It’s in a remote border area, and the trees around have almost all been felled. Only if there is economic development can there be money to protect the environment. You cannot expect the people of the Nu River to keep wearing animal skins and bring in everyone to have a look in the name of ecotourism,’ Bai said. ‘They also have the right to exist, and to development.’”
• Newsweek, 2000: (When western development plan first announced) “I’m not only going to build roads,” boasts Bai Enpei, Xining’s [Qinghai] Communist Party secretary. “I’m going to pave an Information Superhighway.”

Bai Enpei’s Contact Information:

• Address: Yunnan Provincial General Office, Wuhuashan, Kunming, Yunnan 650021.
• Website: www.yndpc.yn.gov.cn
• Phone: + 86 871 3619773
• Fax: + 86 871 3618998

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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

This is a “mini” profile. See information in the Overview box, above right.

Lu Hao’s Contact Information:

• Address: Communist Youth League of China, No. 10, Qianmen Dongdajie, Beijing 100051.
• Website: www.acyf.org.cn
• Phone: +86 10 85212608
• Fax: +86 10 67018131

Note on the Communist Youth League (CYL):

An influential mass organization run by the Party for individuals between 14 and 28. Has about 74 million members and is considered a grooming ground for future Party leaders. Former CYL members form the core of Hu Jintao’s closest colleagues. Other CYL Heads: Hu Yaobang, Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Zhou Qiang and Hu Chunhua.

Background information about Sixth Generation Leaders:

“Sixth generation” leaders will reach the top in 2022, when the leaders who take office in 2012 have completed their likely two five-year terms. [Expected Fifth generation heads are Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang; Mao Zedong was first generation.] In 2009 the official journal Global Personalities featured five individuals born in the 1960s who have been cited by the current leadership as likely candidates for high office in 2022. They are Hu Chunhua, Zhou Qiang, Nur Bekri, Sun Zhengcai, and Lu Hao (China Youth League Head, not Gansu Province Party Secretary). Willy Lam refers to them as having “colossal potential.” Aside from their age and being protégés of Hu or Wen, they have some characteristics in common. At the time of the announcement, they were not well known in China or abroad. None is a princeling. They were all born after the struggle to create the People’s Republic and were too young to be sent-down youths in the Cultural Revolution. Unlike recent leaders, none is an engineer. Three headed the China Youth League.

A general summary of this age group by Melinda Liu, Newsweek, October, 2007:
‘But no one in China is freighted with taller expectations than the offspring of the 1960s. The ’60s Generation, as they’re also known, are seen as worldlier, more traveled and less doctrinaire than any previous Chinese generation. And – though China’s state-run media would never admit it – some Gen-Sixers were probably among the students who rallied at Tiananmen Square in 1989. China will be a different place when they come to power, says Renmin University professor Mao Shoulong. “These younger officials will have liberal thinking and open minds. They’ll see an era of change.”
As a mirror of the society around them, the Gen-Sixers are less ideological and more market-savvy; their peers include private-sector millionaires and environmental activists. But they’re also apt to be nationalistic, even arrogant, some analysts say. “They lack the humility of [their elders],” says Cheng Li, a Sinologist at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Some of them are quite spoiled, in my view.” They certainly have been fortunate compared with earlier generations. For one thing, their higher education was uninterrupted by the traumatic Cultural Revolution of 1966 – 76, when universities were shuttered and students were shipped off to the backcountry to toil in the fields. Instead, they grew up in the era of “opening up and reform,” as (Gen Two) Deng Xiaoping’s quasi- capitalist policies were called.’

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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

This is a “mini” profile. See information in the Overview Box above right. The most detailed article about Sithar is by Reuters India. See http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-33191620080423.

Background:

The UFWD’s 7th bureau was established 2005 to handle Tibetan affairs: according to Singtao Daily its mission is “to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans.”

Note: the Head of the United Front Work Department in the Tibet Autonomous Region, appointed in October 2010, is Qi Zhawa (a Sinicisation of the Tibetan name Dralha). Qi Zhawa/Dralha had previously spent almost his entire career in Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province.

Sithar’s Contact Information:

• Address: 35 Fuyou Street Xicheng District, Beijing 100800.
• Website: http://www.zytzb.cn/09/
• Phone:
• Fax:

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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

Appointed Vice Director of the United Front Department in 1999 and became the Executive Vice Director (Minister) in 2006. Zhu is Vice President of the China Overseas Friendship Association as well as Secretary-General of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture.

Member of the 17th CPC Central Committee.

No information available for the period 1970 – 2006, apart from a reference to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in 2002.

In February 2012 Zhu Weiqun drew the attention of the international media with an article in the party’s ‘Study Times’ journal which said listing ethnic minority status on identity cards, using ethnic names for schools and regions and reserving privileges for ethnic minorities were obstacles to nationalism and cohesion. Some papers reported that this article hinted that the party is considering an abrupt shift towards overtly assimilationist policies, after more than 60 years of recognising cultural and ethnic difference.

Quotations By:

• Zhu Weiqun: In Hong Kong, marking the 40th anniversary of the creation of the TAR, he gave a speech entitled “Buddhism and Building of Harmonious Society.” I, a beginner in study of Buddhism, would like to beg your attention to my humble opinions on Buddhism if they are correct. If my opinions are incorrect, I hope you’ll be kind enough to point out what is wrong with them………..Another example we’d like to cite is the “Theory of Cause” advocated by Buddhism, according to which nothing can exist in isolation and the human being is closely bound up with all other living creatures on earth. Proceeding from this theory, the religion takes equality as the basic principle guiding the handling of the relations between the different peoples and between the human race and all other living creatures. Says the Diamond Sutra, “The Great Law stands for equality, making no distinction between the superior and the inferior. Equality, in our opinion, means mutual respect by the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, the great and the small, and the leader and the subordinate.”
• Exchange of statements with Lodi Gyari December 2009 “Mr. Gyari just tries to steer the topic and distract people’s attention away from the embarrassing issue ‘whether the Dalai Lama lies or not’.”
• Kelsang Gyaltsen on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy: “Zhu Weiqun stated: “Even the title of your memorandum is unacceptable. How many times do we need to say that the Dalai Lama has no right to speak about the situation in Tibet or in the name of the Tibetan people?” When we asked him why in the first place he had invited us to present our views on autonomy, his answer was: “This was a test to see how far you have come understand the position and the policy of the Central Government. And you have failed the examination miserably.”
• In December 2011 in a party journal, Qiushi (Seeking Truth), Zhu Weiqun warned against the rise of religious believers in the CCP. If party members are allowed to believe in religion, he wrote, it will result in “shaking and losing the guiding position of Marxism, and in dividing the party ideologically and theoretically”. (Source: Economist)

Zhu Weiqun’s Contact Information:

• Address: 135 Fuyou Street Xicheng District, Beijing 100800.
• Website: http://www.zytzb.cn/09/
• Phone:
• Fax:

Zhu Weiqun Profile Downloads:

• Zhu Weiqun Tibetan
• Zhu Weiqun French
• Zhu Weiqun Spanish
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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

Joined Party in 1966. Thrived during Cultural Revolution. Worked for 14 years in a Jilin automobile factory, rising to deputy director and vice secretary of the factory’s Party Committee.

Between 1979 and 1984 Du was Party Secretary of Communist Youth League in Jilin Province. This was followed by various other positions in Jilin Province until 1998.

1998 – 2001 Party secretary of Hainan Province.

2001 – 2006 Minister of Agriculture. In 2002, he said that he was working to improve the “troubled food safety and inspection system” in order to increase exports. When Minister of Agriculture, was the object of at least one letter-writing campaign by PETA with regard to methods of killing animals for fur. He also ate chicken on TV to demonstrate that bird flu had been contained.

December 2006 – December 2007, Party Secretary of Sichuan Province.

December 2007 succeeded Liu Yandong as Head of United Front Work Department. He is written about as being a protégé or ally of Hu Jintao, but no details are given except for the Communist Youth League connection.

Quotations By:

• World Buddhist Forum, 28 March 2009: “We anticipate that the Buddhism circle in the world will continue to carry forward the spirit of ‘harmony and synergy’, manifest the feelings of mercy and compassion, reclaim people’s internal spirits, help resolve the difficulties so as to promote the harmonious coexistence between man and nature, man and society, man to man as well as man’s internal world.”
• Responding to Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy, November 2008: “The Dalai Lama should respect history, face reality and conform to the times, as well as fundamentally change his political propositions.”
• Shigatse August 2010 at a conference on democratic management of Tibetan monasteries. “Competent Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns who are politically reliable, extraordinarily learned and widely respected should be selected to monastery management committees through thorough democratic consultation.” (our emphasis)

The UFWD’s 7th bureau was established 2005 to handle Tibetan affairs: according to Singtao Daily its mission is “to cooperate with relevant parties in struggling against secessionism by enemies, both local and foreign, such as the Dalai Lama clique, and to liaise with overseas Tibetans.”

Du Qinglin’s Contact Information:

• Address: 35 Fuyou Street Xicheng District, Beijing 100800.
• Website: http://www.zytzb.cn/09/
• Phone:
• Fax:

Du Qinglin Profile Downloads:

• Du Qinglin Tibetan
• Du Qinglin French
• Du Qinglin Spanish
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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

Alternate Member, 17th CPC, Central Committee As Commander of the PAP, Wang is now a member of the Tibet Working Group on Tibet and likely to have attended the 5th Work Forum.

Like his PAP predecessor Wu Shuangzhan, Wang has the experience of holding office in a military region. He had been commander of a division under a group army in the Shenyang Military Region and later served as commander of the PAP Tibet Division (a position at the rank of deputy army commander), PAP deputy chief of staff, and PAP chief of staff. In 1997 Wang Jianping was promoted to the police rank of PAP major general when Wu Shuangzhan was promoted to PAP lieutenant general. He was promoted to the police rank of PAP lieutenant general in 2007 (China News Agency).

Comments By/About:

• Claude Arpi writes: “General Wang is one of Hu’s (Jintao’s) favorites. The new rising star was elevated twice in 2009 — from PAP chief of staff to Vice-Commander, and now Commander. But oh! surprise, he also served as Commander of the Tibet Autonomous Region.”

Background on PAP:

Since October 2009, Hu Jintao has brought about the largest shakeup in PAP leadership since it was created in 1983. (Similar shakeup in military and security forces.) Willy Lam writes that Hu had two reasons: to raise operational levels in the face of expected continuing socio-political instability [estimated 80-90,000 protests per year] and to ensure loyalty to him and his Youth League faction.

Observation from “Building a Modern Military: The Economic Crisis and its Impact on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army”—Feb. 2009 Kristen Gunness, China Advisor, U.S. Department of the Navy, The Brookings Institution. “Although the Party has put resources into better training for the PAP and other domestic security forces, the lackluster performance of these organizations in some cases has called their competency into question. A recent example is the March 2008 pre-Olympic riots in Tibet, during which the Public Security and PAP forces apparently lost control of parts of Lhasa and the PLA were forced to become involved. In addition, the Party recently issued new PLA training materials for handling unrest and other domestic stability issues, further indicating that the Chinese military could potentially have a more robust role in this area.”

Wang Jianping’s Contact Information:

• Address: People’s Armed Police Garrison Headquarters, 3rd Western Flag, Haiyang area, Beijing (source: Wikipedia)
• Website: No informtion
• Phone: No information
• Fax: No information

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Background information on the Central Military Commission:

The Central Military Commission (CMC) is China’s most powerful military body, comprising the top 10 military chiefs, chaired by China’s civilian leader (Hu Jintao). The CMC is the chief conduit through which the military can influence China’s leadership and vice versa. The CMC’s two Vice Chairs have seats on the Politburo. Wikipedia says the CMC “issues directives relating to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including senior appointments, troop deployments and arms spending.” The CMC shares authority over the People’s Armed Police (PAP) with the Ministry of Public Security.

In 2012, the leadership changes that will take place in the Chinese Communist Party, with the fourth generation retiring to make way for the fifth, will be mirrored in the CMC. Xi Jinping was appointed a Vice Chair of the CMC in October 2010, in preparation for his succeeding Hu Jintao as Party Secretary and State President. Willy Lam speculates that Hu Jintao may try to retain Chairmanship of the CMC until 2014 or 2017 as a means to cling on to power, like his predecessor Jiang Zemin who stayed on as Chair of the CMC for two years after Hu acquired the country’s top jobs. However, Jiang’s eventual resignation may have been brought about through pressure from the military, rather than from Hu. Liberation Army Daily, a publication thought to represent the views of the CMC majority, printed an article on 11 March 2003 which quotes two army delegates as saying, “Having one center is called ‘loyalty’, while having two centers will result in ‘problems.’”

According to Willy Lam the PLA is currently dominated by princelings (offspring of former leaders, a clique to which Xi Jinping also belongs) while Hu’s Communist Youth League clique is under- represented. If Hu stays on as CMC Chair he will be able to ensure that “his protégés, including sixth generation officials, will reap plum party and government posts.”

Analysts STRATFOR, writing about 2012: “The military’s influence over China’s politics and policies has grown over the past decade, as the country has striven to professionalize and modernize its forces and expand its capabilities in response to deepening international involvement and challenges to its internal stability. Fifth generation military leaders…will take office at a time when the military’s budget, stature and influence over politics is growing…, and sees its role as extending to becoming a guide for the country as it moves forward and up the ranks of international power.”

Although the military tends to be more nationalistic, General Liu Yazhou, princeling and commissar at National Defense University, was recently critical of China’s political system: “A system that does not allow its citizens to breathe freely, nor to maximally unleash their creativity, nor puts those who can best represent the people in leadership positions, is doomed.” (HK Phoenix Magazine, August 2010).

Hu Jintao with Military Leaders

Central Military Commission’s Contact Information:

• Website: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/

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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

This is a “mini” profile. See information in the Overview box, above right.

Nur Bekri’s Contact Information:

• Address: People’s Government of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, No.2 Zhongshanlu, Urumqi, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 830041.
• Website: www.xinjiang.gov.cn
• Phone: + 86 991 2803711
• Fax: + 86 991 2817567

Background information about Sixth Generation Leaders:

“Sixth generation” leaders will reach the top in 2022, when the leaders who take office in 2012 have completed their likely two five-year terms. [Expected Fifth generation heads are Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang; Mao Zedong was first generation.] In 2009 the official journal Global Personalities featured five individuals born in the 1960s who have been cited by the current leadership as likely candidates for high office in 2022. They are Hu Chunhua, Zhou Qiang, Nur Bekri, Sun Zhengcai, and Lu Hao (China Youth League Head, not Gansu Province Party Secretary). Willy Lam refers to them as having “colossal potential.” Aside from their age and being protégés of Hu or Wen, they have some characteristics in common. At the time of the announcement, they were not well known in China or abroad. None is a princeling. They were all born after the struggle to create the People’s Republic and were too young to be sent-down youths in the Cultural Revolution. Unlike recent leaders, none is an engineer. Three headed the China Youth League.

A general summary of this age group by Melinda Liu, Newsweek, October, 2007:
‘But no one in China is freighted with taller expectations than the offspring of the 1960s. The ’60s Generation, as they’re also known, are seen as worldlier, more traveled and less doctrinaire than any previous Chinese generation. And – though China’s state-run media would never admit it – some Gen-Sixers were probably among the students who rallied at Tiananmen Square in 1989. China will be a different place when they come to power, says Renmin University professor Mao Shoulong. “These younger officials will have liberal thinking and open minds. They’ll see an era of change.”

As a mirror of the society around them, the Gen-Sixers are less ideological and more market-savvy; their peers include private-sector millionaires and environmental activists. But they’re also apt to be nationalistic, even arrogant, some analysts say. “They lack the humility of [their elders],” says Cheng Li, a Sinologist at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Some of them are quite spoiled, in my view.” They certainly have been fortunate compared with earlier generations. For one thing, their higher education was uninterrupted by the traumatic Cultural Revolution of 1966 – 76, when universities were shuttered and students were shipped off to the backcountry to toil in the fields. Instead, they grew up in the era of “opening up and reform,” as (Gen Two) Deng Xiaoping’s quasi- capitalist policies were called.’

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Standing in the Party and Career Highlights:

Member of 15th, 16th, and 17th Central Committees.

Executive President of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the 2008 Olympics though it is unclear whether he had much influence eg over pollution, traffic, censorship etc.

His provincial experience is considered invaluable for his future prospects; joined Party in 1979 and went to Sichuan. Went to Lhasa in 1993 as Vice-secretary of the TAR Committee; Party Secretary from 2000 – 2004. According to Wikipedia he was “pivotal” in the railway project.

From 2004 – 2007 Guo was Party Secretary of poverty-stricken Anhui just as Beijing turned its attention to interior regions. He did well developing the economy.

Comments By/About:

• Eric Eckholm (NY Times) calls him “an urbane and polished official.”
• Washington Post: “According to state media reports, he has a reputation for directness.” At his mayoral nomination ceremony, he was called ‘clear-minded’ and ‘familiar with party affairs and economic management’.
• Carries a laptop with him everywhere. Surfs the web every day; follows message board discussions. Thinks all leaders should be computer-savvy. More open to media interviews than other leaders. Aware of the value of public relations. In attempting to change Anhui’s bad image (poor, backward, corrupt) he noted that “Image is very important to economic development and I want more people to understand Anhui better.”

From his Time in Tibet

• Kate Saunders, TIN 2003: Tibetan cadres and intellectuals felt relief on his appointment as he was much less hard-line than his predecessor (Chen), though he vowed to follow the same policies.
• NY Times, 2001: Strongly promoted economic development paired with no concessions to HHDL. Defended against the charge that investment in Tibet was designed to dilute Tibetan culture. Denied that Han outnumbered Tibetans in the TAR. Relaxed somewhat the restrictions on religious practice by Tibetan government employees enforced by Chen but maintained the principle that the Party is atheist. ”Conditions for large numbers of Tibetans are still quite backward.” ”This [rapid economic development] is all for the good of the people and to strengthen national unity.” ”Tibet has had some violence in the past, but it is basically stable today,” he said. ”I think that as the economy develops further and people become more prosperous, it will be even more so, and the peoples’ commitment to socialism with Chinese characteristics will be even stronger”.

Guo Jinlong’s Contact Information:

• Address: Mayor of Beijing, Municipal General Office, No. 2 Zhengyilu, Dongcheng District, Beijing 100744.
• Website: www.beijing.gov.cn
• Phone: + 86 10 6519 2209
• Fax: + 86 10 6519 2233

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